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Abstract: I draw upon speech act theory to understand the speech acts appropriate to the multiple 
aims of scientific practice and the role of nonepistemic values in evaluating speech acts made 
relative to those aims. First, I consider work that distinguishes explanatory speech acts from 
descriptive speech acts within scientific practice. I then show how speech act theory provides a 
framework to make sense of explaining’s and describing’s distinct felicity conditions. Finally, I 
argue that if explaining aims to convey understanding to particular audiences rather than describe 
literally across contexts, then evaluating explanatory speech acts directed to nonscientists involves 
nonepistemic criteria. 
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1. Introduction 
Hasok Chang “[complains] about…our [i.e., philosophers of science] habit of focusing on 
descriptive statements that are either products or presuppositions of scientific work, and our 
commitment to solving problems by investigating the logical relationships between these 
statements” (2014, 67–8). He argues philosophers of science should adopt “a change of focus from 
propositions to actions” (67). Chang suggests, “When we do pay attention to words, it would be 
better to remember to think of ‘how to do things with words’, to recall J. L. Austin’s (1962) famous 
phrase” (68).  
In this paper, I take up Chang’s suggestion and argue that attending to Austin’s account of 
the things we do with words can help us understand the multiple aims of scientific practices, the 
speech acts appropriate to those aims, and the roles of nonepistemic values in evaluating speech 
acts made relative to those aims. To do this, I first show how Austin’s speech act theory provides 
a framework for making sense of the ways scientific representations can be used for different 
speech acts depending on one’s aims. Second, I show that evaluating the success of these different 
speech acts involves looking to felicity conditions other than truth and falsity, the securing of 
uptake in one’s audience, and, sometimes, nonepistemic values. 
In §2, I consider philosophers of science working on explanation who have shifted focus 
from propositions to the act of explaining and relate this work to speech act theory.1 In §3, I provide 
details of Austin’s framework to highlight the felicity conditions of speech acts beyond truth and 
falsity. In §4, I consider work on the multiple aims of scientific practice, especially aims related to 
conveying understanding to nonscientists, and argue that evaluating speech acts appropriate to 
those aims involves nonepistemic values.  
                                                        
1 I make no claims Chang influenced this work. 
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2. Things scientists do with words 
2.1 Explaining 
Consider some recent and not-so-recent work on scientific explanation. Andrea Woody’s 
functional perspective motivates “a shift in focus away from explanations, as achievements, 
toward explaining, as a coordinated activity of communities” (2015, 80). In a similar spirit, Angela 
Potochnik argues that “sidelining the communicative purposes to which explanations are put is a 
mistake” (2016, 724). For Potochnik, explaining is a communicative act involving a speaker and 
audience made against a background that shapes the explanations offered. In so arguing, Potochnik 
deliberately recalls Peter Achinstein’s claim, “Explaining is an illocutionary act,” i.e., a speech act 
uttered by a speaker to an audience with a certain force and for a certain point (1977, 1). 
 These accounts share in common an emphasis on the importance of context, especially the 
aims of the speaker and interests of the audience in evaluating, to use Austin’s terminology, the 
felicity conditions of explanatory speech acts. In particular, we might focus on the aims of the 
speaker and their audience in giving and requesting explanations, and the time and location of an 
explanatory speech act in deciding if the act is successful or felicitous. In focusing on the 
explaining act rather than the supposedly stable propositional content of an explanation, our 
attention is drawn to ways of evaluating that act beyond truth and falsity.  
Related to this last point, Nancy Cartwright argues the functions of a scientific theory to 
“tell us…what is true in nature, and how we are to explain it…are entirely different functions” 
(1980, 159). Ceteris paribus laws are literally false, but still do explanatory work. One way to 
understand Cartwright’s claim is that the speech act of describing the world truly and the speech 
act of explaining come apart from one another and fulfill distinct aims within scientific practice. 
It follows that descriptive and explanatory speech acts have different felicity conditions. If this is 
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right, evaluating explanatory speech acts solely in terms of truth or falsity can be inapt. For 
example, suppose explaining aims to increase understanding in one’s audience. As Potochnik 
(2016) argues, what gets explained depends on a speaker’s and audience’s interests, and the 
success of an explaining act in generating understanding depends, in part, on the cognitive 
resources of the audience. As such, to evaluate any given act of explaining requires attending to 
the interests and cognitive resources of speakers and audiences and the context in which 
explanations are offered. This moves beyond merely focusing on the descriptive content of 
explanatory speech acts. 
 
2.2 Multiple aims 
A focus on acts and away from the truth or falsity of descriptive content is not unique to recent 
work on explanation. We see a similar shift in the aims approach to values in science, e.g., Kevin 
Elliott and Daniel McKaughan (2014), and Kristen Intemann (2015). The aims approach, like the 
mentioned work on explaining, recognizes scientific practice aims at more than describing the 
world and so the results of scientific practice can be evaluated from a number of perspectives 
related to those aims. As Elliott and McKaughan put this point, “representations can be evaluated 
not only on the basis of the relations that they bear to the world but also in connection with the 
various uses to which they are put” (2014, 3). Further, if some of those uses include things like 
providing timely input for policymakers or increasing public understanding of science for ethical 
and political reasons, there is a role for nonepistemic values in evaluating the success of those uses.  
I think the general framework of Austin’s speech act theory helps flesh out this picture 
about the multiple aims of scientific practice and their relationship to nonepistemic values in at 
least two ways. First, speech act theory makes sense of how one and the same sentence can be used 
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to perform different speech acts depending on the aims of the speaker and the context of utterance. 
Second, it shows that evaluating different speech acts requires more than looking at “the basis of 
the relations that they bear to the world” (3). Instead, to properly evaluate speech acts we have to 
look to the aims of the speaker and the interests of their audience, including whatever nonepistemic 
values are relevant to those aims and interests. 
Take Austin’s claim that evaluating apparently descriptive speech acts like “‘France is 
hexagonal,’” involves questions about who is uttering the statement, in what context, and with 
what “intents and purposes” (1962, 142). Rather than concluding the sentence is false and leaving 
it at that, Austin points out the different speech acts one can use such a sentence to perform, e.g., 
stating or estimating. In determining the use the sentence is put to—by consulting context and 
inquiring after the aims of the speaker and the interests of their audience—we might realize, 
irrespective of the sentence’s literal truth or falsity, “It is good enough for a top-ranking general, 
perhaps, but not for a geographer” (142). In other words, it serves the aims of the general, which, 
unlike the aims of the geographer, do not require a descriptively literal account of France’s shape. 
As such, evaluating the speech act solely in terms of truth or falsity misses something important 
since the speaker might not be aiming to describe literally, but at something else entirely. Further, 
if the aims of the general are nonepistemic in character, we can evaluate the felicity of the speech 
act relative to how well it meets those aims.  
In making these points, I think Austin is right that we can “play Old Harry with two 
fetishes…(1) the true/false fetish, (2) the value/fact fetish” (150). In combating these fetishes, 
Austin sought to free philosophers from the view "that the sole business, the sole interesting 
business, of any utterance…is to be true or at least false” (1970, 233). In doing so, speech act 
theory motivates a constructive shift from the truth or falsity of descriptive statements to 
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considering the multiple aims we have in performing different speech acts and the role of 
nonepistemic criteria in evaluating how well those speech acts meet aims not purely epistemic in 
character. 
To expand on this picture, I turn to explicating Austin’s speech act theory. 
 
3. Speech act theory 
3.1 Performatives and constatives 
Austin first drew our attention to things we do with words by discussing performative utterances. 
Of these, Austin says, “if a person makes an utterance of this sort we should say that he is doing 
something rather than merely saying something” (1970, 235). Imagine a speaker utters ‘I promise 
to return my referee report in two weeks’ during the peer-review process. In promising, Austin 
claims the speaker does not describe an internal act she has concurrent to her utterance. Instead, in 
making that utterance, the speaker performs the act of promising thereby committing herself to 
actions related to the timely review of papers. 
 While promising has no special connection to truth, it still must meet certain felicity 
conditions to be happy. In order to successfully promise to return their referee report in two weeks, 
the speaker must meet the sincerity condition of forming an intention to do so and must also be 
able to realize their intention. There is unhappiness in, or an abuse of the speech act if the speaker 
promises knowing other commitments will prevent her from returning the report in two weeks. 
The speaker must also have the authority to make a promise; unless authorized, an editor cannot 
promise on behalf of a reviewer. There should also exist a convention for making promises in this 
context. Such conventions might allow the speaker to promise without uttering, ‘I promise,’ e.g., 
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by accepting a request that reads, ‘In agreeing to review you commit to returning your report within 
such-and-such a time.’ 
 Austin first contrasts performatives with constatives, e.g., descriptive statements or 
assertions that aim to state something true about the world, but which do not seem to be actions. 
However, Austin claims describing and asserting are as much actions as promising, even if their 
felicity conditions are closely connected to truth and falsity. Consider an editor saying of a 
reviewer, ‘They review quickly, and I expect they will return their review within two weeks.’ In 
saying this, the editor commits herself to providing evidence for her description of the reviewer as 
quick, and perhaps justifying her expectation that the reviewer’s past behavior provides good 
evidence for future behavior. As Robert Brandom says, “In asserting a claim one not only 
authorizes further assertions, but commits oneself to vindicate the original claim, showing that one 
is entitled to make it” (1983, 641). That is, the utterer must be in a position of authority—here in 
an epistemic sense—with regards to the claim and be ready to perform further speech acts if 
prompted. Other felicity conditions of assertions include a sincerity condition; generally, people 
should believe what they say. Finally, the context of an assertion shapes its felicity conditions: an 
editor should utter the sentence in appropriate circumstances, e.g., as a response to concerns about 
the speed of the reviewer. Should these conditions not be met, the speech act might be unhappy 
even if true. 
 
3.2 Locution and illocution 
Austin develops speech act theory to capture the similarities between performatives and 
constatives. Speech acts like promising and describing have three dimensions: the locutionary 
content, which is the conventional sense and reference of the uttered sentence; the illocutionary 
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force, which is the use the utterance is put to; and the perlocutionary effects, which are intended 
and unintended “effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, 
or of other persons” (1962, 101).  
Austin’s points about the illocutionary dimension of a speech act most clearly capture how 
a single representation can be put to different uses depending on our aims, and how different uses 
have different felicity conditions despite sharing locutionary content.2 Consider the sentence, ‘This 
product contains chemicals known to cause cancer.’ The locutionary content consists in the 
proposition expressed by the sentence as determined by the conventional sense and reference of 
the words and can be common to different illocutionary acts. Someone uttering the sentence could 
be describing a product, issuing a warning, or explaining why they use a particular product but not 
another. Uttering the sentence with the force of a description, the force of a warning, or the force 
of an explanation will share some felicity conditions related to truth. Namely, the locutionary 
content should be true or approximately true to count as a good description, a good warning, or a 
good explanation.  
However, a warning might be infelicitous in ways a description might not. For example, 
warnings might be issued only when a pre-determined level of significant risk at a certain level of 
exposure is met. In cases where such levels are not met, issuing a warning might be infelicitous. 
Consider also that uttering such a sentence with the force of an explanation might be called for 
only if, e.g., someone is prompted to justify their choice of a product that does not contain cancer-
causing chemicals over a more easily available and cheaper product that does. In these last two 
                                                        
2 The inductive risk argument in science and values focuses on perlocutionary effects. See Heather 
Douglas (2009) and Franco (2017). 
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cases, nonepistemic criteria related to risk, cost-effectiveness, and so on can be used to evaluate 
the happiness of warnings or explanations. 
Austin thinks attending to these points combats a form of abstraction that distorts our 
thinking about the felicity conditions of speech acts. When examining descriptive statements, 
Austin thinks “we abstract from the illocutionary…aspects of the speech act, and we concentrate 
on the locutionary” (1962, 144–5). Such an approach focuses on “the ideal of what would be right 
to say in all circumstances, for any purpose, to any audience, &c.” (145). But in doing so, “we use 
an over-simplified notion of correspondence with the facts—over-simplified because essentially it 
brings in the illocutionary aspect” (145). Questions concerning correspondence with the facts 
brings in the illocutionary aspect since truth or falsity does not attach to sentences or locutionary 
content. Instead, truth or falsity is related to particular things speakers do with words. Descriptions 
might be true or false, but, strictly speaking, not warnings or explanations. In order to know, then, 
if evaluating a speech act along the true-false dimension is apt, we need to know its illocutionary 
force. But to know the illocutionary force requires we attend to context, including the aims of both 
speaker and audience, time and place of utterance, and conventions governing the specific speech 
situation. In this way, Austin argues context and aims are central to determining the illocutionary 
force of a speech act, and hence to evaluating its felicity.  
 
4. Aims approaches and speech act theory 
4.1 Explaining and understanding 
Scientific practice might seem to deal in paradigmatically constative speech acts, e.g., descriptions. 
Such speech acts are, to varying degrees, evaluable along dimensions of truth or falsity in ways 
we might question speech act theory’s relevance to philosophy of science. Maybe scientific 
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practice just is a case in which abstracting away from illocutionary force to focus on locutionary 
content is appropriate. For example, Austin says “perhaps with mathematical formulas in physics 
books…we approximate in real life to finding” speech acts where focusing solely on the 
locutionary content is not pernicious (1962, 145). If scientific practice aims at timeless, true 
descriptions holding across all contexts independent of the aims and interests of speakers and 
audiences necessary to evaluating the felicity of speech acts, then perhaps speech act theory is 
irrelevant to philosophy of science. 
 Yet, as Austin points out, “When a constative is confronted with facts, we in fact appraise 
it in ways involving the employment of a vast array of terms which overlap with those that we use 
in the appraisal of performatives. In real life, as opposed to the simple situations envisaged in 
logical theory, one cannot always answer in a simple manner whether it is true or false” (141–2). 
Consider again ‘France is hexagonal.’ Austin asks, “How can one answer…whether it is true or 
false that France is hexagonal? It is just rough, and that is the right and final answer to the question 
of the relation of ‘France is hexagonal’ to France. It is a rough description; it is not a true or false 
one” (142). Though rough, it is still open to evaluation. We can ask if it accords with conventions 
governing estimations for the particular purpose it is put to and if this particular estimation serves 
the purposes and interests of the speaker and their audience. ‘France is hexagonal’ can count as 
felicitous even if rough and not literally true because it might aim at something other than truth. 
McKaughan makes a related point about scientific speech acts. He argues certain speech 
acts central to scientific practice like “conjecturing, hypothesizing, guessing and the like often play 
a role in scientific discourse that serves neither to assert that an hypothesis is true nor to express 
such a belief” (2012, 89). For example, following Woody, when examining particular acts or 
patterns of explaining used in scientific practice we might focus not on the locutionary content, 
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but on the ways “explanatory discourse…functions to sculpt and subsequently perpetuate 
communal norms of intelligibility” (2015, 81). In focusing on this aspect of explanatory speech 
acts, we might find, for example, that “the ideal gas law’s role in practice is not essentially 
descriptive, but rather prescriptive; by providing selective attention to, and simplified treatment 
of, certain gas properties (and their relations) and ignoring other aspects of actual gas phenomena, 
the ideal gas law effectively instructs chemists in how to think about gases as they are characterized 
within chemistry” (82). On Woody’s view, the ideal gas law, in practice, does not have the force 
of a descriptive speech act, but lays down a rule guiding the investigation of gases.3 The success 
of explanatory speech acts from this perspective has less to do with describing actual gases, and 
more to do with the way they facilitate, say, the education of new scientists or increase 
understanding of related phenomena, e.g., “by laying foundation for the concept of ‘temperature’” 
beyond “the subjective, inherently comparative quality of human perception” (82). Depending on 
one’s aims, an explanatory act that fails to increase understanding of related phenomena might be 
infelicitous even if the locutionary content confronts the facts in approximately true ways. 
In a related vein, Potochnik claims “that what best facilitates understanding is not 
determined solely by the relationship between a representation and the world” (2015, 74). Suppose 
a scientist’s aim is to increase understanding of some phenomena rather than to describe it in all 
its complexity. In this case, a particular explanatory speech act making use of the ideal gas law is 
not defective because it fails to describe all causal factors at play in the behavior of actual gases. 
An explanatory speech act making use of an idealization might successfully fulfill the aims of a 
scientist insofar as it “secure[s] computational tractability” or isolates “all but the most significant 
causal influences on a phenomenon” (71). In eschewing descriptive complexity in favor of other 
                                                        
3 Austin (1962, 143) entertains a similar point about laws. 
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goals, we increase our understanding by facilitating “successful mastery, in some sense, of the 
target of understanding” or “by revealing patterns and enabling insights that would otherwise be 
inaccessible” (72).  
Moreover, Potochnik argues, “Because understanding is a cognitive state, its achievement 
depends in part on the characteristics of those who seek to understand,” including both the speaker 
and the audience (2015, 74). In evaluating an act of explaining, then, we should look at how the 
speaker’s aims shape the focus of their explanation and also how the explanation increases an 
audience’s understanding, where this involves considering their interests in seeking an 
explanation. An explanation irrelevant to the audience’s interests or that fails to increase their 
understanding or guide their thinking about related phenomena, but that nonetheless has 
approximately true locutionary content might count as infelicitous.  
 
4.2 Values 
On the views of explaining canvassed, the aims of generating literally true descriptions of the 
world come apart from, say, explaining and understanding the most important causal factors at 
play for a given phenomenon. Now, as the aims approach to the role for nonepistemic values in 
scientific practice emphasizes, explaining and describing to fellow scientists do not exhaust the 
goals of scientific practice. The aims approach focuses on the ways “scientific decision-making, 
including methodological choices, selection of data, and choice of theories or models, are...a 
function of the aims that constitute the research context” (Intemann 2015, 218). Given that the 
research context includes social, political, and moral considerations, the aims of science are often 
nonepistemic in character. 
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 Consider, for example, the American Geophysical Union’s position statement on human-
induced climate change. At the end of their statement, they claim, “The community of scientists 
has responsibilities to improve overall understanding of climate change and its impacts. 
Improvements will come from pursuing the research needed to understand climate change, 
working with stakeholders to identify relevant information, and conveying understanding clearly 
and accurately, both to decision makers and to the general public” (American Geophysical Union 
2013). Here, I focus on the claim that scientists have responsibilities to improve the understanding 
of policymakers and the general public. Drawing upon the aforementioned work on explaining, I 
consider how this aim and the values of policymakers and the public shape the nonepistemic 
felicity conditions of explanatory speech acts directed at them. 
 Notice that the position statement distinguishes the research necessary to understand 
climate change from conveying that understanding to policymakers and the general public. The 
sense in which these activities come apart and have different felicity conditions can be made sense 
of, in part, by focusing on the audience to whom scientists are speaking. For Potochnik (2016), 
understanding is a cognitive state that depends on the abilities and interests of those explaining 
and those to whom explanations are directed. In communicating to specific audiences of 
policymakers and specific audiences composed of members of the general public, scientists should 
consider the interests of the audience in asking for an explanation as well as their level of 
knowledge regarding the phenomenon in question, in this case, climate change.4 In so doing, 
scientists might find a description that describes climate change in all its complexity might not 
serve these aims well. Instead, scientists might aim for an explanation that, though omitting 
                                                        
4 Assuming a specific audience is identifiable. See Stephen John (2015) on the difficulties of 
carrying out similar suggestions when no single, specific audience is identifiable. 
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descriptive complexity, draws upon models that include causal factors related to their audiences’ 
interests in understanding climate change, some of which will be nonepistemic character, e.g., 
mitigating risks from extreme weather events. Furthermore, a scientist’s speech acts should be 
cognitively accessible for the nonscientists in their audience, perhaps in such a way that it guides 
their thinking more generally about climate change and its impact on things they value.5  
 On this point, the American Geophysical Union’s position statement maintains scientists 
ought to enlist the help of stakeholders in identifying potentially relevant information to their 
research. In developing the aims approach, Intemann emphasizes a similar point. She says of 
climate science, “[T]he aim is not only to produce accurate beliefs about the atmosphere, but to do 
so in a way that allows us to generate useful predictions for protecting a variety of social, economic 
and environmental goods that we care about” (2015, 219). In the view of the American 
Geophysical Union, in order to do this well, scientists ought to consult with relevant stakeholders 
and policymakers regarding their values. For example, if stakeholders and policymakers 
communicate worries about extreme weather events and ask about “how to adapt to ‘worst case 
scenarios,’ then models able to capture extreme weather events should be preferred” to models 
that “anticipate slow gradual changes” (Intemann 2015, 220). Notice that in making such a 
decision, the grounds for choosing models able to represent aspects of climate change relevant to 
stakeholders’ interests are nonepistemic rather than epistemic, e.g., generating predictions useful 
for protecting goods stakeholders care about. Insofar as the explanations generated do not meet 
these goals because they are unrelated to stakeholders’ interests, the attendant speech acts might 
be infelicitous even if they describe some related phenomenon more or less accurately. 
                                                        
5 This suggestion could be extended to other forms of communication, e.g., visual representations 
like infographics.  
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 Both points about pitching cognitively accessible explanations and choosing models for 
representing climate change phenomena in ways sensitive to stakeholders’ values and interests 
illustrate Austin’s emphasis on the importance of uptake to successfully performing a speech act. 
Austin claims, “Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily, 
successfully performed….I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say 
and takes what I say in a certain sense….Generally the effect amounts to bringing about the 
understanding of the meaning and force of the locution” (1962, 116). In aiming to convey 
understanding through explaining relevant aspects of climate change to policymakers and the 
public, a speaker should consider the interests, background knowledge, and cognitive resources of 
their audience. Insofar as scientists fail to do so in explaining to nonscientists, they will not secure 
uptake in the sense of generating understanding in their audience, even if the locutionary content 
of their speech act approximates truth. 
 Of course, a scientist’s explaining something to their audience will also be infelicitous if 
based on inaccurate information or if it extrapolates from what is known to their audience’s 
interests in unjustified ways. However, if scientists aim to increase public understanding, they 
should not stick solely to descriptively complex claims, but aim at making explanatory speech acts 
relevant to their audience’s interests in cognitively accessible ways. Elliott, for example, 
emphasizes the importance of securing uptake in discussing how scientists should communicate 
uncertainty: “It does little good to expect scientists to provide unbiased information to the public 
if their pronouncements are completely misinterpreted or misused by those who receive them” 
(2017, 89). Thus, if scientists are to meet responsibilities the American Geophysical Union claims 
they have with regard to conveying understanding about climate change, those scientists should 
communicate using explanatory speech acts best able to secure uptake in the general public and 
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policymakers. This involves considering the epistemic and nonepistemic interests and cognitive 
resources of their audience in ways that shape the felicity conditions of the speech acts beyond 
truth and falsity. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Speech act theory can tie together threads in recent work on explaining and the aims approach to 
values in science that share in common a shift in focus from descriptive propositions to other things 
scientists do with words. Explaining is at least one of the things scientists do with words that aims 
at something other than describing the world literally. When we look at, say, the aims of scientists 
in explaining some phenomena to nonscientists through the lens of speech act theory, our attention 
is drawn to ways explanatory speech acts can be happy or unhappy beyond describing truly or 
falsely. For example, successfully securing uptake in the general public or policymakers in ways 
that increases their understanding of phenomena relevant to their nonepistemic interests requires 
attention to the cognitive resources and values of audiences, as well as the contexts in which 
explanations are requested. These all shape the felicity conditions of speech acts directed to the 
general public or policymakers. Future work within this framework may aim to articulate in greater 
detail the felicity conditions of speech acts made relative to the multiple aims of scientific practice 
with an eye towards their connection to the nonepistemic values of speakers and audiences. 
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